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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this research, we implement a multiple logistic regression model in which the
coefficients of indicator variables are constrained to be zero or positive. By doing
this, the contribution of each variable to the failure probability can be assessed. Due
to this restriction on the coefficients, a Bayesian approach to parameter estimation—
which assigns mixture priors to the coefficients—is taken. The data is provided by a
large health insurance company in Western Pennsylvania and includes the enrollment
status and corresponding values of 84 predictor variables for 1,280,612 individuals.
The insurer feels the analysis is needed to determine why its membership is declining,
why its cost trend is higher than the national average, and what logical steps can be
taken to reverse the current trends.

1.1

Statement of Problem

Over the last few years the health insurance market in Western Pennsylvania has experienced several changes. Foremost of these was the introduction of a new regional
insurance provider. Before this plan was created, one insurer provided coverage for
a large majority of the commercial health insurance market. Since the new plan was
introduced, the large insurer has lost significant membership. In addition to the in1
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creased competition, the economic impact of September 11th has caused changes in
the commercial health insurance market. In an effort to control health insurance premium increases, employers, especially small business owners, have shifted more of the
cost of health insurance to their employees. This cost shifting has come in the form of
premium shifting as well as benefit cost shifting. For the employee, this means larger
amounts deducted from their earnings to pay for insurance (the premium shifting),
and higher co-pays and deductibles to pay when they need healthcare (the benefit
cost shifting) (Draper et al. 2003). Along with the changing market environment, the
demographics in Western Pennsylvania continue to change. Based on the average age
of its residents, Allegheny County is the second oldest county in the United States.
Between 1990 and 2000, the Pittsburgh metropolitan region’s population decreased
by 2 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census). The age segments with the largest decreases were 60-64, 25-34, and 20-24 (−25%, −24%, and − 18%, respectively). The
age segments with the largest increases were 85+, 45-54, and 75-84 (41%, 38%, and
23%, respectively).
As a result of the changing market, consumers are offered more options when
choosing their health insurance. In an effort to more closely compete with the newer
health insurance provider, the large insurer has made more health insurance product
options available to the consumer. This increase in choice has allowed the consumer
to choose the health plan that best fits his or her needs and financial situation.
As a result, the healthiest members generally choose the products with the lowest
premiums while the members with higher disease risk choose more generous benefit
plans with higher premiums but lower co-pays and deductibles that they will be
required to pay throughout the year (Sutton et al. 2002). This situation leads to
adverse selection, which occurs when ”the people who sign up for an insurance plan
have costs that are greater than the expected costs that the insurance plan used to
calculate the premium” (HealthInsurance.info 2002). Adverse selection increases the
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uncertainty in the pricing of products as well as causing unforeseen large and sharp
changes in the underlying prices and pricing trends. This in turn, forces the insurer to
raise premiums on the whole. The new increase in price (both premium and benefits)
will force additional selection as the relatively lower cost people look for relief from
premium increases. As the total number of members decreases, the average cost of
the plan then increases, as the total health care expense (both fixed and variable
costs) is spread over fewer members. This cycle of
• Relatively low cost members disenrolling,
• Average cost per member increasing, and then
• Premiums increasing
is sometimes called the premium death spiral. Adverse selection happens more often
in health insurance than other types of insurance such as auto or homeowners because
unlike these other types of insurance, health insurance is not required or mandated
by the government or other large institutions. Since everyone, not just the drivers
who have accidents, are required to have auto insurance, the average risk of an auto
insurer remains fairly constant over time.
These changes have caused the large insurance provider to experience changes in
their membership base. The insurer has experienced large decreases in enrollment and
a surge in costs that the company had never seen before. As a non-profit organization,
the insurer is required to insure anyone who requests coverage. Historically, the
insurer’s market share was large enough that the ratio of high risk to low risk members
was stable and the cost of high risk members did not significantly influence the average
cost per member. As the enrollment declines, the ratio of low risk to high risk
members decreases causing the overall average cost per member to increase faster
than expected. Even if the large insurer’s population mix of high risk and low risk
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members had not changed, the decrease in enrollment would force the insurer to raise
premiums for the remaining members to cover the fixed operating costs.
If the insurer could predict with some accuracy which individuals will leave and/or
join the plan, it could develop marketing strategies aimed at the people likely to
leave as well as accurately set premiums for the remaining people. If the premiums
are calculated with more accuracy, the degree of adverse selection will decrease and
the death spiral may stop. If, however, the insurer does not develop a method for
controlling its turnover, it will continue down the premium death spiral until the
only members left are the ones with the highest costs. We will attempt to model the
adverse selection for the large insurer by determining which demographic and health
factors are most common in the members who have left.

1.2

Methodology

Member turnover is defined as members enrolling in and disenrolling from the provider’s
health insurance plans. To determine the characteristics of members who disenroll,
we will examine a data set containing various demographic and health related variables for members who were enrolled as of June 2002. Each member in the database
will be defined as a success if they are still enrolled as of June 2003. Those that left
this provider before June 2003 will be defined as failures.
Let Yi represent the success/failure status of the ith member. Thus Yi = 1 if the
ith member is not enrolled as of June 2003, otherwise Yi = 0. Assuming the Yi ’s are
independent, Bernoulli random variables with individual failure probabilities pi , the
joint distribution f of all Yi ’s is given by the product of n Bernoulli mass functions:

f (Y1 , . . . , Yn |p1 , . . . , pn ) =

n
Y

pYi i (1 − pi )1−Yi .

(1.1)

i=1

To determine how the pi ’s are linked to the Yi ’s, we assume each Yi is accompanied
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by a vector X i of covariate values

X i = {Xi1 , Xi2 , . . . , Xim },

where Xij represents for person i the value of the jth covariate (j ≤ m). Recognizing
that each person has both a response Y and a vector of covariate values X, we let
the probability of a failure response (Y = 1) be a function of the covariate vector.
Specifically, if Yi is the response for person i, and Xi is the corresponding covariate
vector for this person, then we define the probability pi that Yi = 1 as

pi =

e(g(X i ,β ))
,
1 + e(g(X i ,β ))

(1.2)

where

g(Xi , β) = β0 + β1 Xi1 + β2 Xi2 + · · · + βm Xim .

(1.3)

In this way, we have constructed a linear model for estimating the natural logarithm
of the quantity

pi
.
1−pi

This natural logarithm, as a function of pi is referred to as the

logit function, or logit(pi ). Notice that the only unknown on the r.h.s of (1.2) is the
vector of parameters β. We estimate these parameters (and hence the probability pi
for a given covariate vector Xi ) based on the linear regression model

logit(pi ) = g(X i , β) .

Before providing the details behind estimating the parameter vector β, we first
define the variables that compose the covariate vector, Xi . Because the values of
these variables will potentially predict the failure probability, we will also refer to
these variables as predictor variables.
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1.2.1

Predictor Variables

By estimating the probability of disenrollment for a given set of predictor variables,
the insurer will be able to identify which members will leave the plan each year. By
having a better projection of the total membership, the insurer will be able to set
more accurate premiums, reduce the degree of adverse selection, and possibly stop
the death spiral. We will attempt to determine which of the variables listed below
are most influential in predicting turnover. In order to capture the best subset of
predictor variables, we will include a wide variety of demographic, health related,
and employer related variables. We give consideration to the following and point out
the variable 1 through 7 are continuous variables while variables numbers 8 or greater
are indicator variables (or a set of related indicator variables):
1. HealthRisk 1 : Indexed variables for the health status of an individual. The
index for both the current time period and the predictive index are included.
2. Copay: The amount the individual was required to pay for services between
July 2001 and June 2002.
3. Elig: The number of months an individual was enrolled between July 2001 and
June 2002.
4. NetPayments: The amount the insurer paid for services on behalf of an individual between July 2001 and June 2002.
5. Age: The age of the individual as of January 2002.
6. Product: The product the individual was enrolled in as of June 2002.
7. NumProducts: The number of products the individual had to choose from
when selecting their level of coverage.
1

HealthRisk and ACC’s are based on copyrighted software developed by DxCG, Inc., 25
Kingston Street, Suite 200, Boston, MA 02111.
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8. ACC001-ACC026: Aggregated medical condition categories. Twenty-six indicator variables that categorize the diagnoses reported for the individual between June 2001 and July 2002. A value of 1 indicates that the individual was
grouped into that condition category. An individual can be assigned to more
than 1 of these categories.
9. Child: A value of 1 for this variable indicates that the individual is under the
age of 18.
10. ClientLeft: A value of 1 indicates that the employer cancelled their contract
with the insurer.
11. County: The county the individual resides in. The sample is limited to the 29
counties the insurer uses to identify its Western PA region. A value of 1 for any
of the 29 indicator variables indicates that the member lives in that county.
12. Dependent: A value of 1 indicates that the individual is an employee’s dependent.
13. Family: A value of 1 indicates that the individual is part of a family contract.
14. Male: A value of 1 indicates the individual is male.
15. Nodiag: A value of 1 indicates that the individual had no diagnoses between
July 2001 and June 2002.
16. Nohcc: A value of 1 indicates that the individual was not assigned to a condition category.
17. Novalid: A value of 1 indicates that the individual had no valid diagnosis
records.
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18. Regional: A value of 1 indicates that the employer the individual is insured
through is a local company. A 0 indicates that the employer is a national
company.
19. Risk: A value of 1 indicates that the insurer is at risk for the expenses incurred
by this individual and not the employer associated with the individual.
20. SIC: The Standard Industry Code for the employer the individual is insured
through.
21. Spouse: A value of 1 indicates that the individual is an employee’s spouse.

1.2.2

Data Collection and Cleansing

The initial data set includes all of the predictor variables listed above for 1,280,612
individuals. In order to exclude members who may be eligible for Medicare, the sample
is limited to members under the age of 60. Any negative values in NetPayments
were set to zero. Such negative amounts occur occasionally and erroneously in the
data due to the timing of adjustments. Another option would have been to eliminate
the records with negative values, decreasing the number of observations in the data
set.
Descriptive statistics were examined for each of the 84 independent variables.
Since less than 1% of the individuals had a value of 1 for the indicator Novalid,
it was eliminated. Several variables were removed based on their high correlation
with other variables. The SIC indicator variables were removed because they were
correlated with other variables and with each other. The concurrent health risk
score was also removed since it is correlated with the prospective health risk score
and with NetPayments. This is not surprising since the concurrent score attempts
to explain the current year’s expenditures while the prospective score attempts to
predict next year’s resource consumption. Both scores are based on the individual’s
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current year’s diagnosis history. Nohcc was eliminated because of its high correlation
with Nodiag. This is not surprising either since an individual must have a diagnosis
to be categorized into an ACC. After eliminating these 15 variables (one each for
each of the 12 SIC codes), we are left with m = 69 independent variables. The 19
variables listed above increase to 69 variables when the 26 ACC’s are expanded into
26 separate indicator variables and indicator variables are created for all but one of
the Counties. A member who lives in Allegheny County has Xij = 0 for each j that
corresponds to one of the 29 County variables.
Chapter 2 contains a detailed description of the data model and an outline of the
algorithm used to estimate the model parameters. Chapter 3 applies this model to the
data and details the results of the parameter estimation. Chapter 4 concludes with
a discussion of the model (its usefulness/features/limitations), computational issues
surrounding the implementation of the model, and suggestions for future research.

Chapter 2
Data Model and Parameter
Estimation
2.1

Data Model

Let Y1 , . . . , Yn represent the status of each individual in our data set, where Yi = 1
indicates that member i disenrolled and Yi = 0 indicates that member i was still enrolled in the insurer’s plan at least 12 months later. We model the outcomes Y1 , . . . , Yn
as independent Bernoulli random variables with failure probabilities p1 , . . . , pn . This
gives from (1.1) the following likelihood function for p1 , . . . , pn :

L(p1 , . . . , pn ) =

n
Y

pYi i (1 − pi )(1−Yi ) .

i=1

Substituting for pi from (1.2) gives an equivalent likelihood in terms of β:

L(β) =

n
Y
i=1

e(g(X i ,β ))
1 + e(g(X i ,β ))

!Yi 

1
1 + e(g(X i ,β ))

(1−Yi )
.

(2.1)

When estimating β it is easier to work with the natural log of the likelihood function.
10

11
Let l(β) denote the natural log of the likelihood function in (2.1). After simplification
we have:

l(β) =

n h
X


i
Yi g(X i , β) − ln 1 + e(g(X i ,β ))
.

i=1

2.2

Parameter Estimation

To estimate β0 , β1 , . . . , βm , we first choose initial values β 0 :
(0)

(0)

(0)
β 0 = (β0 , β1 , . . . , βm
).

(2.2)

Actual initial values for the m = 69 variables under consideration were chosen by
using the PROC LOGISTIC function in the SAS STATS software package. Initial
values were chosen in this manner to decrease the burn-in period and to increase the
rate of convergence. The initial values are reported in Appendix A.
Next we sample from the posterior distribution of these parameters using Markov
Chain Monte Carlo techniques (Gilks et al. 1996). To do this, we first propose a
new β0 , call it β0p from a proposal density q. This proposed value is selected from a
uniform distribution with parameters β0 −k and β0 +k, where k is a tuning parameter
set to = 0.01. The proposed value β0p will be accepted or rejected with probability α,
where:
[exp(l(β))π(β)](p) q(β|β p )
·
α = min 1,
[exp(l(β))π(β)](0) q(β p |β)



,

Here π is the prior distribution for β, [·](p) denotes an expression evaluated at the
proposed value of β0 , and [·](0) denotes an expression evaluated at the current value
p
q(β |β )
of β0 . In addition,
is the Hastings ratio of the probability of moving to the
p
q(β |β )
current state from the proposed state to that of moving in the opposite direction.

12
If the proposed value is accepted, β0 is replaced with β0p in β. If not, β remains
unchanged. This updating process is repeated for each βj . Values are sequentially
proposed and accepted/rejected for individual components of β until convergence is
obtained.
As for the prior distribution on the βi ’s, we model these coefficients as apriori independent. The intercept and the slope coefficients for the continuous variables of g
are assigned normal zero-mean priors allowing for any inverse relationships (i.e. negative coefficient values) between the independent variable and the outcome. All other
slope coefficients of g—those that correspond to the indicator variables—are assigned
mixture priors. In this way the slope parameters of the dichotomous variables are
constrained to be either zero or positive, allowing for a straightforward measurement
of a variable’s contribution to the disenrollment probability. Other examples where
mixture priors are useful include (Graves et al. 2003). The mixture prior chosen for
the coefficients of the dichotomous variables in this problem is the Expert Opinion
Gamma Point Mass Distribution (EGPM).

2.2.1

Expert Opinion Gamma Point Mass Distribution

Let g denote the density function of a gamma random variable, and let h represent
the density function of a beta random variable:
β α α−1 −βx
x e
, for x > 0
Γ(α)
Γ(a + b) a−1
h(x|α, β) =
x (1 − x)b−1 , for 0 < x < 1 .
Γ(a)Γ(b)
g(x|α, β) =

Let G and H denote the cumulative distribution functions of the gamma and beta
distributions, respectively:
Z
G(x) =

x

Z
g(t|α, β)dt

0

and

H(x) =

x

h(t|a, b)dt .
0
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Now, we define the Gamma-Point-Mass (GPM) distribution. The GPM distribution
is a combination of a gamma distribution and a point mass on zero. If X has a GPM
distribution, then we denote the distribution as gpm(x) and define it as:


 p
if x = 0
gpm(x|α, β, p) =
.

 (1 − p) · g(x|α, β) if x > 0
If GP M (x) represents the CDF of this distribution, then using the definition of the
GPM distribution we can write GP M (x) in terms of G(x):
Z

x

gpm(t|α, β, p) · It>0 dt

GP M (x) = gpm(x = 0|α, β, p) +
0

= p + (1 − p) ∗ G(x) .

Let U ∼ beta(a, b). Then Y has an Expert-Opinion GPM (EGPM) when Y =
GP M −1 (U ). The distribution of Y can easily be expressed from the CDF FY (y) of
Y:

FY (y) = P {Y ≤ y} = P {U ≤ GP M (y)} = H(GP M (y))
= H(p + (1 − p) · G(y)) .

From this CDF we can find the EGPM density fY (y). First consider the case when
y > 0:

fY (y) = FY0 (y) = H 0 (GP M (y)) · GP M 0 (y)
= h(p + (1 − p) · G(y)) · (1 − p) · g(y) .

The probability that Y = 0 is found by:

P {Y = 0} = FY (0) = H(GP M (0)) = H(p) .
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Combining these two results gives the EGPM distribution of f:

f (y|α, β, a, b, p) =



 H(p)

if y = 0


 h(p + (1 − p) · G(y)) · (1 − p) · g(y) if y > 0

2.2.2

EOGPM Parametrization

The expert opinion gamma point mass distribution has gamma parameters v and w,
beta parameters a and b and a probability mass of p located at zero. In order to
incorporate the expert opinion, the parameters of the beta distribution a and b are
set to:

a = qM + 1

and

b = (1 − q)M + 1

where q is specified by the expert and M , whose magnitude is proportional to the
strength of the expert’s specification, is either fixed or variable. The vector q represents the expert’s opinion on the importance of each independent variable. The
expert assigned a value between 0 and 1 where a 1 is used to identify the variables
he or she feels are most important. The EOPGM parameters, v, w, p, and M were
fixed:

v = 0.1,

w = 10,

p = 0.2,

and M = 4 .

The vector of q values was chosen to reflect the views of the author. The values are
recorded in Appendix B.
Because the data set is so large, n = 1, 280, 612, this or any other reasonable prior
distribution will have negligible influence on parameter inference.

Chapter 3
Applications
The results examined here are based on the output from 12,112 iterations of the
Bayesian multiple logistic regression model described in Chapter 2. The values from
the first 7,609 iterations are used for burn in, which leaves 4,503 to be used for
parameter inference calculations. The convergence of the model will be discussed in
Chapter 4. To achieve tolerable levels of computational efficiency—and allow for a
future validation study—the data was partitioned into development and testing sets.
The development set contains 70% of the data (sampled randomly) or information
on 896,428 individuals. The proportion of members who left is consistent across the
samples; in each data set approximately 22% of the members disenrolled.

3.1

Results

Variables with a large proportion of coefficient estimates equal to zero are least likely
to contribute to the probability of an individual disenrolling. The three variables that
have ≥ 75% of their coefficient estimates equal to 0 are listed here:
• The coefficient for Child has E(βi ) of 0.00009. The probability that this βi = 0
is 81.2%. So, being under the age of 18 has no impact on whether the member

15
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disenrolls.
• The coefficient for Family has E(βi ) of 0.00018. The probability that this βi = 0
is 80.6%. Belonging to a family contract does not increase your probability of
disenrolling. The inverse is not necessarily true since the coefficient estimate
was constrained to be greater than or equal to 0. In other words, not belonging
to a family contract could increase the probability of disenrollment.
• The coefficient for Regional has E(βi ) of 0.00012. The probability that this
βi = 0 is 76.4%. This result implies that working for a local employer does not
increase the probability of disenrolling. Again, the inverse is not necessarily
true.
Variables with no coefficient estimates equal to zero are most likely to contribute
to the probability that an individual will disenroll. In addition, the magnitude of
their effect on the probability of disenrolling is measured by the mean value of the β
estimates. The variables with all (or nearly all) of their coefficient estimates greater
than zero are given here.
• ClientLeft has the most influence on the probability that a member will disenroll. For this variable E(βi ) is 1.91 and P (βi > 0) = 1. This result seems
obvious since the individual will no longer have the option of being insured
through this provider. There are cases, however, where the individual continues
their coverage. This could be due to a variety of reasons such as:
– the individual changes jobs, or,
– the employer no longer offers any health insurance benefit, forcing the
employee to buy his or her own policy.
• Several County variables have a significant impact on the probability that a
member will disenroll. For each of these counties the P (βi > 0) = 1:
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County E(βi )

County E(βi )

Mercer 1.81

Warren 0.51

Beaver 0.83

Somerset 0.48

Venango 0.66

Lawrence 0.10

Further investigation should be done to determine why these counties have a
greater impact on disenrollment than others. One possible explanation is that
most of the providers in these areas are affiliated with the competitor.
• There are several condition categories, ACC’s, that increase the probability
that an individual will disenroll. For all of these conditions the P (βi > 0) = 1:
ACC

E(βi )

ACC

E(βi )

Cardio-Respiratory Disease

1.16

Substance Abuse 1.01

Vascular Disease

1.15

Mental Disorders

0.14

Again, further investigation should be conducted on these variables. A few
possible explanations for disenrollment in these cases are that the person became
disabled (a debilitating mental disorder or heart condition) or passed away
(substance abuse or cardio-respiratory disease).
• Risk indicates whether the employer or the insurer is at risk for the health care
expenditures associated with that employer and, hence, how the premiums are
calculated. The individuals for which the insurer is at risk are slightly more
likely to leave, E(βi ) = 0.009 and P (βi > 0) = 0.998. This could be attributed
to the price the insurer sets for these individuals.
• An individual who has no diagnoses during a 12 month period, Nodiag=1, is
more likely to leave. The mean coefficient estimate for this variable is 0.006 and
the P (βi > 0) = 0.992.
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The coefficient estimates for the continuous variables are interpreted differently, as
these coefficients were allowed to range over the whole set of real numbers (positive
and negative values). Each continuous covariate has a different range of plausible
values. Hence, the range of values has to be combined with the mean value of the
estimate to determine the effect these variables have on the probability of disenrolling.
The following is a list of the continuous variables that are most likely (based on the
proportion of coefficient estimates equal to zero and the mean value of the estimates)
to influence the failure probability.
• NetPayments has an inverse relationship with the probability that an individual will leave. The expected value of β for this variable is very small, −0.00001,
but never assumes a value of zero. The values, Xij for this covariate range from
$0 to over $1,000,000 with a mean value of $1,450 and median of $312. The
range of values the coefficient estimate could take for this variable (as compared
to those for a zero-one variable) range from 0 to less than -10. A person with
mean annual expenditures would have a coefficient equivalent to -0.01. This
result implies that a person with higher annual expenditures is less likely to
disenroll than someone with little to no costs.
• The HealthRisk variable has an inverse relationship with the disenrollment
probability. The expected value of β for this variable is -0.012, with the vast
majority of these estimates less than zero. The prospective health risk score for
this sample ranges from 0.088 (healthy) to 89.251 (very ill) with a mean value
of 0.97. Because the coefficient for HealthRisk is negative, a person with a
high risk score is more likely to disenroll.
• NumProducts, the number of products a member has to choose from, also
has an inverse relationship with the probability of disenrolling. The number
of products offered ranges from 1 to 10, with a mean of 2.96 and median of 3.
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Members who had fewer products to choose from are more likely to disenroll
than those with multiple offerings (E(βi ) = −0.13). Combining the range of
values with the mean value of the coefficient estimate gives a possible range
of -0.13 to -1.3. An individual offered the average number of products would
have a coefficient equivalent to -0.39. The number of products offered can be an
indication of the size of the employer, larger employers would be able to offer
more selection than smaller employers (where size is measured by the number
of employees).
• Age also has a significant impact on the probability that a person will leave,
E(βi ) = −0.01. Only members under the age of 60 were included in the data.
The mean age of this population is 31, the median is 33. The range of values the
coefficient could take (as compared to the coefficients of the zero-one variables)
are 0 to -0.60. This means that a younger person is more likely to disenroll than
an older person. The equivalent coefficient for an average member is -0.31.
The relevance of these results to the problems the insurer is facing will be discussed
further in Chapter 4.
A complete list of the mean estimate for each β and the corresponding proportion
of coefficient estimates that were equal to 0 is reported in Appendix C. The first
variable listed in Appendix C is the intercept term, the next 7 are the continuous
variables, the next 8 are dichotomous variables listed in decreasing order by the
number of individuals who possess that characteristic, the next 26 are the individual
ACC’s, and the last 28 are the individual County variables. The ACC and County
variables are also listed in descending order by prevalence.
In order to corroborate the results for the dichotomous variables, the response variable was examined for all individuals corresponding to cases where Xij = 1 for each
dichotomous variable j = {8, 9, . . . , 69}. The proportion of individuals in the data set
who disenrolled when Xij = 1 is reported in Appendix D. We would expect that the
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variables with the largest proportion of members who disenrolled when Xij = 1 would
have the most impact in the model. For instance, the variable ClientLeft contains
the largest proportion (56%) of disenrolled members when ClientLeft = 1. The
coefficient estimates from the implementation of our model tell us that ClientLeft
has the largest impact on the probability of leaving. Another example of the corroboration: Of the individuals classified as children (under the age of 18), 21.37% had a
response variable equal to 1. The proportion of the total sample that left is 21.94%,
which is close to the proportion of children who left. The coefficient estimate for
Child confirms that Child has no influence on the probability of disenrolling.

Chapter 4
Discussion
4.1

Summary of Model Relevance

In this research, we have applied a multiple logistic regression model to individual
enrollment data obtained from a large health insurance provider. The model allowed
• coefficients for continuous variables to range over the set of real numbers (both
positive and negative), but
• restricted coefficients of dichotomous variables to be greater than or equal to
zero.
Such a restriction allows for measuring the influence each covariate has on the disenrollment probability, both in terms of the probability of contributing to disenrollment
and the magnitude of the contribution. This coefficient specification is easily modelled using a Bayesian approach. The choice of an EOPGM prior distribution on
the zero-or-positive coefficients allows for the expert opinion to be incorporated in a
straightforward manner. (Although, in this application, the data set is large enough
to dominate the prior opinion and hence the inference on β. The contribution of the
prior to the log-likelihood sum, as given in Equation 2.2, is < 1%.)
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The results of this model indicate that the insurer’s commercial managed care
business may be in a premium death spiral. Recall the death spiral is defined by
the cycle of relatively lower cost members disenrolling, causing the average cost per
member to increase, which in turn causes the insurer to raise premiums. We now
ascertain evidence from our model output in support of these components:
• Several results point toward lower cost members disenrolling:
– NetPayments has a significant inverse relationship with the probability
of disenrollment. This implies that relatively lower cost members are more
likely to leave.
– The member’s RiskScore has an inverse relationship with the disenrollment probability. This result implies that a healthier person (a lower risk
score) is more likely to disenroll. A healthier person would have lower
annual expenditures.
– The member’s Age also has an inverse relationship with the probability
of disenrollment. Younger members typically incur lower costs than older
members. Therefore, younger members having a higher probability of disenrolling implies that less expensive members are more likely to disenroll.
– If the covariate Nodiag is equal to 1, the probability of disenrolling increases. Having no diagnoses implies that the member incurred very little,
if any, costs during the year. Hence, this result also implies that members
with low costs are more likely to disenroll.
• Low cost members disenrolling will cause the average cost per member to increase if the insurer does not enroll new low cost members to replace those that
left. The insurer’s base enrollment has been decreasing over the past few years
so it is not probable that the new membership is offsetting the effect of lower
cost members leaving.
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• It is widely known that the insurer has been raising premiums by 20% or more
each year. The coefficient estimate for Risk indicates that members the insurer
is at risk for are more likely to leave. The premium amount for these individuals
is based on the cost trend for all members of the insurance plan while the
premium amount for members whose employer is at risk for their expenses is
based solely on the expenses those employees incur. So, the effect of adverse
selection would impact the premium charged to members for which the insurer
is at risk, not those for which the employer is responsible.
The same model parameters would have to be estimated for previous and future
time periods to be able to state definitively that the insurer is in a premium death
spiral. If the results of the model are not replicated for other time periods, the adverse
selection that occurred here could be considered a one time event and the insurer may
not be in the midst of a death spiral. Although, other informal studies in which the
author has been involved indicate that the cycle of events that define a premium
death spiral started before June 2001 and promise to continue through 2004.
In order for the insurance company to use any of the results reported herein to
improve profitability, many different departments would have to be convinced of the
model’s accuracy and dependability. As with many organizations, the majority of
employees do not have an extensive statistical or mathematical background. These
people may have trouble accepting results that are different from or in opposition to
common beliefs about the industry.
Assuming the right people are convinced of the impact the results of this model
could have, many positive actions could be taken to gain back some market share
and increase profitability. One of the easier measures to implement that could increase enrollment would be for the marketing department to turn their focus to the
demographic and geographic factors most likely to increase the probability of disenrollment. Actuaries could use the model to predict which members will still be
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enrolled during the next time period so that they could set more accurate premiums. Many other marketing, medical management, and pricing policy efforts could
be improved by combining the results from this model with their current processes.

4.2

Convergence

Because the data matrix examined here is so large—896,428 rows by 70 columns—
the processing time for one update of β takes approximately 2.75 minutes. This time
includes all of the measures taken to improve efficiency. To complete one update of
the entire β vector, the program must compute the log likelihood function 70 times.
The log likelihood function calculates g(X i , β) given by Equation 1.3 for each i,
where i = 1, . . . , n and n is the number of rows in the data set. In order to reduce
the number of iterations completed by the log likelihood function, a streamlined log
likelihood function was called for the variables with the fewest number of ones. Such
streamlining was possible because for variables composed of mostly zeroes, the only
difference between the log likelihood calculation for the current versus the proposed
βi is the value of the proposed βi . If the value of the variable is 0 the result of
g(X i , β) will be the same for the current and proposed values of βi . Hence, those
rows can be excluded from the calculation. Computer memory constraints allowed
for this more efficient log likelihood calculation to be applied to the estimation of 30
of the 70 coefficients.
This program was tested on two differed Unix servers. The difference in run time
between the two servers was significant. The university’s server took at least 10 times
as long to update the β vector as compared to the server owned by the insurance company. This improvement was observed despite the fact that the insurance company’s
server only allows a process to use a maximum of 25% of its CPU.
Ideally, we would have liked to run the program for a longer time period to better
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ascertain the convergence of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm. Time constraints only allowed for the completion of 12,112 iterations. The first 7,609 estimates
were used for burn in and are excluded from all parameter inference calculations.

4.3

Future Analyses

Based on the results of this model, our analysis could continue in many different
directions. The ideas mentioned here are certainly not inclusive but could provide
further insight into the underlying causes of the insurer’s current enrollment and
profitability issues. Separate models could be built for different segments of the
population. For instance, a model could be built to determine the variables that
influence disenrollment at the client level rather than the individual level. Another
model could be constructed to determine the factors that influence a member’s choice
of product in an effort to predict movement between products offered by the same
insurer. Yet another study could be conducted to determine whether the size of the
client, estimated here by NumProducts, influences member disenrollment.
Another area for future work lies in improving the computational efficiency of this
and other similar models that analyze large amounts of data. Increasing iteration
speed and decreasing time to convergence are desirable improvements to the current
model.
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Appendix A
(0)

Initial Values: βi
i

Estimate

i

Estimate

i

Estimate

0

0.0171

14 0.1501

28 0.0611

42 0.0096

56 0.7371

1

0.0270

15 0.0092

29 0.0599

43 0.0222

57 0.0566

2

0.0002

16 0.0089

30 0.1113

44 0.1699

58 0.4598

3

0.0001

17 0.0143

31 0.0111

45 1.4496

59 0.0783

4

0.0140

18 0.0457

32 0.0415

46 0.1560

60 0.0223

5

0.0917

19 0.0054

33 0.7303

47 0.0531

61 0.2474

6

0.0272

20 0.0086

34 0.0462

48 0.0864

62 0.0752

7

0.0826

21 0.0099

35 0.0591

49 0.3443

63 0.2275

8

0.0551

22 0.0169

36 0.0550

50 0.2973

64 0.0342

9

0.6994

23 0.0183

37 0.0284

51 0.3673

65 0.2161

10 0.5651

24 0.1129

38 0.4568

52 0.1677

66 0.0829

11 0.0087

25 0.1253

39 0.0414

53 0.5433

67 0.2772

12 0.8084

26 0.0213

40 0.0913

54 0.0463

68 0.7515

13 0.0611

27 0.0026

41 0.5346

55 0.0974

69 0.0688
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i

Estimate

i

Estimate

Appendix B
Expert Values
i

qi

1

0.9

15 0.7

29 0.3

43 0.5

57 0.7

2

0.7

16 0.5

30 0.3

44 0.3

58 0.3

3

0.9

17 0.5

31 0.5

45 0.9

59 0.3

4

0.7

18 0.5

32 0.5

46 0.3

60 0.5

5

0.7

19 0.7

33 0.3

47 0.5

61 0.3

6

0.7

20 0.5

34 0.7

48 0.3

62 0.5

7

0.3

21 0.5

35 0.3

49 0.5

63 0.3

8

0.7

22 0.7

36 0.3

50 0.3

64 0.5

9

0.9

23 0.5

37 0.5

51 0.3

65 0.5

10 0.9

24 0.3

38 0.3

52 0.3

66 0.3

11 0.5

25 0.5

39 0.7

53 0.5

67 0.3

12 0.7

26 0.5

40 0.3

54 0.3

68 0.3

13 0.5

27 0.3

41 0.3

55 0.3

69 0.3

14 0.9

28 0.5

42 0.3

56 0.3

i

qi

i

qi

i

qi

i
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Appendix C
Table of Estimates
Variable Name Mean Value Proportion of Estimates Equal to 0
Intercept
1.69211
0
Prospective HealthRisk
-0.01234
0
Copay
-0.00006
0
-0.11943
0
Number of Months Eligible
Annual Expenditures
-0.00001
0
Age
-0.01198
0
Product
-0.01968
0
-0.12816
0
Number of Products Offered
Family
0.00018
0.806
Regional
0.00012
0.764
Risk
0.00877
0.002
0.00142
0.530
Male
Child
0.00009
0.812
No Diagnoses
0.00620
0.008
Spouse
0.00408
0.268
Client Cancelled
1.90995
0
ACC’s:
Ears Nose & Throat
0.00052
0.691
Musculoskeletal
0.00385
0.304
Skin Related
0.00384
0.309
Metabolic
0.00380
0.302
Heart
0.00369
0.345
Gastrointestinal
0.00376
0.311
Genital System
0.00406
0.292
Lung
0.00392
0.294
Infectious & Parasitic
0.00356
0.318
Mental Disorder
0.14339
0
Eye
0.00390
0.311
29

30
Variable Name Mean Value Proportion of Estimates Equal to 0
ACC’s (continued)
Uncertain Neoplasm
0.00391
0.286
0.00398
0.306
Neurological
Urinary System
0.00379
0.298
Diabetes
0.00417
0.261
Hematological
0.00388
0.303
0.00388
0.265
Malignant Neoplasm
Pregnancy Related
0.00168
0.013
1.14930
0
Vascular Disease
Substance Abuse
1.01289
0
0.19817
0.050
Neonates
Liver Disease
0.00395
0.289
Developmental Disorder
0.00377
0.326
0.00390
0.304
Cerebro-Vascular Disease
Cognitive Disorder
0.00386
0.309
Cardio-Respiratory
1.15581
0
Counties
Westmoreland County
0.00385
0.305
0.00401
0.289
Erie County
Butler County
0.00383
0.312
0.00404
0.285
Washington County
Beaver County
0.82910
0
Cambria County
0.00374
0.312
0.00393
0.309
Fayette County
0.00485
0.186
Blair County
Armstrong County
0.00401
0.300
Mercer County
1.80536
0
Indiana County
0.00404
0.300
Lawrence County
0.09738
0
Somerset County
0.48232
0
Crawford County
0.00383
0.309
Jefferson County
0.00367
0.262
Clearfield County
0.00384
0.255
Elk County
0.00373
0.314
Clarion County
0.00409
0.290
McKean County
0.00384
0.274
Warren County
0.50781
0
Venango County
0.65666
0
Bedford County
0.00393
0.227
0.00394
0.245
Greene County
Huntingdon County
0.00384
0.243
Cameron County
0.00398
0.288
Potter County
0.00387
0.316
0.00383
0.260
Centre County
Forest County
0.00398
0.300

Appendix D
Actual Proportion of Members
Who Left When Xij = 1
Total Sample Proportion = 0.2194.

Variable Name Proportion
Client Cancelled
0.5620
0.3151
Beaver County
Centre County
0.3067
Warren County
0.2918
Cardio-Respiratory
0.2818
0.2777
Substance Abuse
0.2773
Mercer County
0.2710
Blair County
No Diagnoses
0.2684
Pregnancy Related
0.2589
0.2526
Venango County
Risk Rated
0.2469
Cognitive Disorder
0.2423
Jefferson County
0.2420
Clearfield County
0.2361
Mental Disorder
0.2268
Developmental Disorder
0.2197
Male
0.2195
Neonates
0.2153
Liver Disease
0.2142
Child
0.2137
Urinary System
0.2137

31

32
Variable Name Proportion
Family Contract
0.2135
Lawrence County
0.2131
0.2129
Elk County
Cerebro-Vascular Disease
0.2099
0.2089
Neurological
Forest County
0.2086
0.2081
Vascular Disease
Lung
0.2050
0.2040
Spouse
Infectious & Parasitic
0.2036
0.2034
Somerset County
0.2031
Hematological
Genital System
0.2028
Regional Account
0.2021
Fayette County
0.2017
0.2015
Cameron County
Huntingdon County
0.2013
0.2008
Ears Nose & Throat
Gastrointestinal
0.1999
0.1960
Skin Related
Musculoskeletal
0.1934
Eye
0.1932
Crawford County
0.1904
Butler County
0.1890
0.1885
Erie County
Diabetes
0.1883
McKean County
0.1882
0.1878
Malignant Neoplasm
Cambria County
0.1871
0.1845
Clarion County
Uncertain Neoplasm
0.1835
Bedford County
0.1834
Indiana County
0.1822
Metabolic
0.1790
Heart
0.1775
Westmoreland County
0.1717
Armstrong County
0.1678
Washington County
0.1675
Greene County
0.1387
Potter County
0.1377

